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and their Employees
Abstract. The purpose of this study is to present the notion of mercenaries laid down in literature and in 
international law, as its applicability to private military companies and their employees so. The fi rst chapter 
examines the use of the notion of mercenaries in literature and in international treaties. It explores whether the 
defi nition laid down in international treaties, refl ect customary international law, or not. The second chapter of the 
study scrutinizes the various conditions listed in the afore-mentioned notions and tries to fi nd out whether and to 
what degrees private military companies and their employees meet them. The fi nal conclusion of this paper–of the 
perspective of international law–is that private military companies and their employees, in accordance with the 
rules of international law, cannot be considered mercenaries.
Keywords: mercenary, private military companies, combatants, Additional Protocol I, international humanitarian 
law, contractor, motivation, direct participation in hostilities
Introduction
“Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on 
these arms, he will stand neither fi rm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious and without 
discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies…”1–writes 
Machiavelli in his groundbreaking work, The Prince, giving substratum to numerous 
thinkers of contemporary international special literature,2 who are concerned with the 
outsourcing of military activities. This clearly shows that the subject is critical and 
problematical in various relations. However, reality requires to unfold another side of the 
question, namely that “PMC-s do not follow the heritage of mercenaries. By national 
fi nancing they end such confl icts that must not unfold.”3
By taking this thought into consideration–besides that the topic is situated in various 
disciplines’ (legal science, military science and security policy) scope–current study’s aim 
is to investigate the applicability of the concept of mercenaries determined by international 
law in relation to private military companies and their employees. The fi rst part of the study 
focuses on the concept of mercenaries under the examination of literature and international 
law’s contractual rules. Furthermore, it strives to answer the question whether the 
international legal concept of mercenaries is part of customary law or not. The second part 
studies the applicability of the concept’s every element with regards to contractors. 
* PhD Student. Assistant lecturer. Széchenyi István University, Faculty of Law and Political 
Sciences, Department of Administrative and Financial Law. H-9026 Győr, Egyetem tér 1.
E-mail: janos.kalman88@gmail.com
1 Machiavelli, N.: A fejedelem. Budapest, 2006. 61.
2 See Gulam, H.: The rise and rise of Private Military Companies. http://media.peaceopstraining.
org/t heses/gulam.pdf (12. 06. 2013.) 3.
3 Beutel, M. D.: Private Military Companies: Their emergence, importance, a call for global 
regulation (thesis). http://princess.digitalfreaks.org/thesis/beutelmdthesis.pdf (12. 06. 2013.) 10.
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In the study, the concepts of private military companies or PMSCs (private military 
and security company) mean enterprises with legal personalities, under employer or 
contractor we mean a natural person. Furthermore, all enterprises providing military or 
security service for supplying national duty are handled under the notion of private military 
companies.4
1. Concept of mercenaries in literature and international law
When investigating that who and when can be regarded as a mercenary, we ought to be 
extremely careful, as the notions included in domestic and international literature consider 
those circles and people who fall within the scope of the notion wider than contractual and 
customary law of international law. They use wide enough notions in order to consider 
employees of private military companies as mercenaries. Therefore, it is not by chance that 
international media tends to mix contractors with mercenaries.5
1.1. The notion of mercenaries in literature
When clarifying the defi nition of mercenaries, we take a wider range of data, that is, the 
ideation of literature as a basis. The reason for this is that the subject of this investigation is 
a recent phenomenon connected to various disciplines and when analyzing it, it is practical 
to take theoretical defi nitions as a base. Hereby, the difference between theoretical ideation 
and international law regulating national practice can be emphatically highlighted. 
In the broadest sense, those people may be regarded as mercenaries, who fi ght for 
fi nancial gain in foreign wars; they are primarily used by armed groups and occasionally by 
governments, as well.6 It is clear that this notion’s dominant element is the motive of 
gaining wealth, which makes the circle of people belonging to this group unduly wide. It 
needs to be narrowed down. 
Laurie Nathan defi nes mercenaries as: people, who–in favour of money–serve a 
foreign country’s army or a movement leading to an armed confl ict–whether participating 
directly in fi ghts or indirectly, by training, logistical assistance, secret agent activity or 
consultancy–and fall outside of the scope of authority of one’s own country’s government 
and protection.7 Besides the motive of gaining wealth, independency from its army also 
plays part in it.
By further narrowing down the concept, according to Scott C. Goddard, we can regard 
that person or organization as mercenaries who (or which) is fi nanced to accomplish tasks 
within a foreign entity’s military scope–also referring to participation in military-like 
action–without taking into consideration any kind of ideology, legal or moral obligation or 
4 The author is aware of the differences between military and security companies, either in their 
concept, or functions, but according to the study’s topic it is dispensable to consider them together.
5 See Scahill, J.: Blackwater. The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army. New 
York, 2008.
6 Center for Humanitarian Dialogue: Small Arms and Human Security Bulletin, Issue 3, 2004. 
http://www.hdcentre.org/publications/small-arms-and-human-security-bulletin-issue-n%C2%B03 
(18. 07. 2012.) 2.
7 Nathan, L.: Lethal Weapons: Why Africa needs alternatives to hired guns. Track Two, 6 (1997) 
2, 10–12.
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rules of domestic or international law.8 Compared to what has been previously stated, this 
concept points out to the amoral and illegal side of mercenaries’ activity.
And fi nally, one of the most complex notions comes from Ervin Frigyes, who states 
that “Mercenaries are those people or groups of those people–united in different 
organizational units – who perform military (martial, military training, strategic and tactical 
planning, connected to martial weapons’ maintenance and operation) activity without all 
kinds of ethnical, nationality, ideological or regional bonds, exclusively for material 
renumeration and are only motivated by fi nancial interests for any clients–who pays them 
out.”9
After listing the above notions we can state that everyone emphasizes fi nancial 
motivation as mutual element and surplus ones (for instance lack of ideology or illegal 
characteristics) are gathered under this concept. Employees of private military companies 
can be regarded as part of these notions without further investigation, hereby, they can be 
regarded as mercenaries. However, this could only be established with a superfi cial 
investigation. From humanitarian legal point of view, in case of an armed confl ict it is 
matter of life and death whether a person can be regarded as mercenary or not. Notions of 
literature cannot be seen as basic of labelling, therefore, we ought to closely examine the 
rules of international law.
1.2. Notion of mercenaries in international treaties
Three international treaties deal with the notion of mercenaries: 1.) 1977 Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International. Armed Confl icts (hereinafter: Additional Protocol I);10 2.) the 1977 
Organization of African Unity Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa 
(hereinafter: African Union Convention);11 and 3.) 1989 International Convention against 
the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries that was meant to be universal 
(hereinafter referred to as UN Convention).12
Additional Protocol I was the fi rst international treaty that aimed at clearing up the 
question of mercenaries. It sought to confi ne mercenaries among frameworks by stating that 
they cannot be regarded either as combatants or as prisoners of war.13 Above these, 
mercenaries are defi ned by Article 47 as any person, who:
8 Goddard, S. C.: The Private Military Company: A Legitimate International Entity Within 
Modern Confl ict (Thesis). Forth Leavenworth, Kansas, Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and 
General Staff College, 2001. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2001/pmc-
legitimate-entity.pdf (18. 07. 2012.) 8.
9 Frigyes, E.: Magánosítás, katonaság, katonai magánvállalkozások (Privatization, military, 
private military companies). Új Honvédségi Szemle, 2001/5.
10 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Confl icts, Geneva, 1977, UN Reg. No. 17512.
11 Organization of African Unity Convention for the elimination of mercenarism in Africa, 
Libreville, 1977, UN Reg. No. I-25573.
12 International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries, New York, 1989. december 4., UN Reg. No. 37789.
13 The diplomatic conference, which was agreed in Additional Protocol I, was not unanimous as 
regards the notion of mercenaries. Some delegations favoured a short and simple defi nition of a 
mercenary, because of the danger that qualifi cations might empty the concept of any real meaning. 
Other delegations, by calling for an enumeration of the criteria for a mercenary and by noting that 
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a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fi ght in an armed confl ict;
b) Does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
c) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain 
and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the confl ict, material compensation 
substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions 
in the armed forces of that Party;
d) Is neither a national of a Party to the confl ict nor a resident of territory controlled by 
a Party to the confl ict;
e) Is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the confl ict; and
f) Has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the confl ict on offi cial duty as a 
member of its armed forces.
It emerges from the wording that in order to regard someone as a mercenary–therefore 
being able to part from combatants and civilians–one has to correspond to six conjunctive 
conditions. From this we can also conclude that if employees of private military companies 
do not correspond to even only one condition, they cannot be labelled as mercenaries, that 
is, they must be put in the category of combatants or civilians. However, we bump into a 
problem here, as employees of private military companies take place somewhere between 
these two categories and their international legal regulations are hardly satisfying. That is 
why they use “grey area” in international literature to describe operational area of 
contractors, as partly their operation is regulated and partly it operates freely.14
The African Union Convention practically takes over the notion of Article 47 of 
Additional Protocol I word by word, and sets the same conjunctive terms for qualifying 
someone as a mercenary.15
The application circle of the UN Convention is wider than that of the other two. This 
treaty created much wider and comprehensible notions. It labels two categories of people as 
mercenaries. The fi rst category corresponds to the above-mentioned criteria, except that the 
direct participation in fi ghts is not a condition.16 According to the second criterion, a 
mercenary is also any other person, who in any other situation:
a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in a concerted 
act of violence aimed at: 
i. Overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the constitutional order of a 
State; or 
ii. Undermining the territorial integrity of a State;
certain types of individuals should be excluded from the defi nition, lent support to a more detailed 
and elaborate defi nition. See Offi cial Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffi rmation and 
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Confl icts, Geneva (1974–
1977), Vol. XV, Committee III Report, CDDH/236/Rev. l. 97. http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_
Law/RC-dipl-conference-records.html (05. 06. 2013.).
14 Liu, Hin-yan: Leashing the Corporate Dogs of War: The Legal Implications of the Modern 
Private Military Company. Journal of Confl ict & Security Law, 15 (2010) 1. http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1599073 (31. 05. 2013.) 159.; Crawford, E.: The Civil-Military Interface in 21st Century Armed 
Confl ict–Private Military Contractors and the Principle of Distinction. Sydney Law School Research 
Paper, (2011) 11/45, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1909666 (31. 05. 2013.) 3; Del Prado, J. L. G.: Private 
Military and Security Companies and the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries. Journal of 
Confl ict & Security Law, 13 (2008) 3.
15 African Union Convention Article 1.
16 UN Convention Article 1.
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b) Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for signifi cant private gain 
and is prompted by the promise or payment of material compensation;
c) Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which such an act is directed;
d) Has not been sent by a State on offi cial duty; and
e) Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose territory the act is 
undertaken.
As can be seen, we also talk about conjunctive conditions in this case as well, 
furthermore, in the case of point a) action must correspond to various conditions.
The African Union Convention and the UN Convention go further compared to 
Additional Protocol I in the sense that they declare it illegal and punish mercenaries, their 
recruitment, training, fi nancial support, and employment.17 However, it must be noted that 
in a UN Resolution from 196818 it was declared that employing mercenaries against 
movements for national liberation and independence is punishable as a criminal act and that 
the mercenaries themselves are outlaws. Furthermore, it calls upon the Governments of all 
countries to enact legislation declaring the recruitment, fi nancing and training of mercenaries 
in their territory to be a punishable offence and prohibiting their nationals from serving as 
mercenaries. The UN General Assembly further reconfi rmed it in 1973.19
Already in 1984, International Law Commission regarded mercenaries as an 
international crime to the extent that the way this practice aims at violating states’ 
sovereignty and governments’ stability and at prevention of national liberation movements, 
it means crime against Peace and Security of Mankind.20
With regards to historical traditions as well, most states stayed away from the African 
Union Convention and the UN Convention, however, states mostly dispose of the question 
of mercenaries in their own domestic law. Hereby, Act IV of 1978 about the Criminal Code 
prohibits recruiting and punishing it in 154. §. Any attempt to recruit personnel in the 
territory of the Republic of Hungary for military service–other than for any allied forces–, 
paramilitary service in a foreign armed body, or any mediation of volunteers for such 
service shall be construed a felony and punishable by imprisonment between one to fi ve 
years. Furthermore, any Hungarian citizen shall get the same punishment who voluntarily 
joins or offers to join any foreign armed body–other than the allied forces–that is involved 
in an armed confl ict (national or international), or who participates in training in such an 
armed body.
Act C of 2012 about (the new) Criminal Code that came into effect on 1st July, 2013 
takes over the previous regulation word by word, it only supplements it with a certifi ed case 
as based on the 146. § (3) that if in the territory of Hungary someone recruits people 
younger than 18-yearsold for military service to foreign armed forces, or to other service 
with military interest, or transmits applicants for similar service shall be sentenced to jail 
from two years to eight years. However, the new CC makes a dogmatic refi nement, as it 
replaces it from crime against humanity to the group of war crimes. However, we can 
critically say about the operative and operative-to-be CC that the fact of illegal recruiting 
17 Szalai, A.: A katonai magánvállalatok részvétele és jogállása a fegyveres konfl iktusokban 
(The participation and the legal status of the private military companies in hostilities). Föld-rész, 
(2010) 1–2, 40.
18 UN Resolution A/RES/2465(XXIII).
19 UN Resolution A/RES/3103(XXVIII).
20 Dinh, N. Q.–Daillier, P.–Pellet, A.–Kovács, P.: Nemzetközi közjog (International public law). 
Budapest, 2005. 462.
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does not punish fi nancial support of foreign armed forces, and it can only be connected to 
supporting the opponent’s state of affairs, if the fi nancial support materializes with the aim 
of weakening Hungary’s military strength.
Based on investigating international treaties we can determine that in each of them, the 
defi nition of mercenaries is based on Additional Protocol I. They follow the same scheme; 
they list numerous conditions which all need to be met to label someone as a mercenary.21 
However, many states stayed away from the African Union Convention and the UN 
Convention–as we have previously mentioned–so the following question will be that 
whether we can regard the notion of mercenaries based on Additional Protocol I as 
customary law, hence, compulsory for each state.
1.3. Notion of mercenaries in international customary law?
According to the study be the International Committee of the Red Cross about international 
humanitarian customary law the notion of mercenaries written in Additional Protocol I is 
part of customary law these days. Pursuant to the Rule 108 mercenaries, as defi ned in 
Additional Protocol I, do not have the right to combatant or prisoner-of-war status. 
However, they may not be convicted or sentenced without previous trial.22
However, answering the question is not so easy, possible reasons for the statement of 
International Committee of Red Cross needs to be investigated. First of all, Additional 
Protocol I is one of the most widely ratifi ed international treaties. It was ratifi ed by 173 
states until the summer of 2013; among them are the states of the European Union, China, 
The Russian Federation, Japan or Brasil.23 Four of fi ve permanent members of UN Security 
Council.24 None of the states had reservation regarding the notion framed in Article 47 of 
Additional Protocol I. Out of the 28 states of NATO 26,25 plus all three states waiting for 
joining26 ratifi ed the protocol. With regards to international confl icts, governments, UN 
Commissions, and International Committee of the Red Cross frequently recalls the 
Additional Protocol I.27 Military manuals of many countries, for instance Argentina, 
Australia, Belgium, France, the Netherlands or Spain contain a defi nition of mercenaries 
that is identical to the one provided by Article 47 Additional Protocol I.28
21 Mancini, M.: Private military and security company employees: Are they the mercenaries of 
the twenty-fi rst century? EUI Working Paper, AEL 2010/5. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?a 
bstract_id=1720543 (08. 06. 2013.) 4.
22 Henckaerts, J.-M.–Doswald-Beck, L.: Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
Volume I: Rules. Cambridge, 2005. http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/fi les/other/customary-international-
humanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf (05. 08. 2013.) 391.
23 The complete list of the ratifi ng countries: http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.
xsp?xp_view States=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=470 (19. 06. 2013.).
24 United Kingdom, France, China, Russia.
25 The two exeptions are the United States of America and Turkey.
26 Georgia, Macedonia, Ukrain.
27 Scharf, M. P.: The ICC’s Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique of 
the U.S. Position. Law and Contemporary Problems, 64 (2001) 1, http://scholarship.law.duke .edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1201&context=lcp (26. 05. 2013.) 93.
28 Henckaerts, J.-M.–Doswald-Beck, L.: Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume 
II: Practice. Cambridge, 2005. http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/fi les/other/customary-international-
huma nitarian-law-ii-icrc-eng.pdf (27. 05. 2013.) 2576.
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Arguments next to the customary-like nature of the notion of mercenaries can be 
convincing, as for the fi rst sight they can suggest that two elements of custom creation of 
law: “general practice” and “legal conviction”, the opinio iuris sive necessitatis. However, 
the second element needs to be further examined, as beyond repetition, existence of 
conscience of legal obligation is also a condition.29
When listing the above-mentioned conditions, it may come into view that the United 
States of America has not been mentioned. The reason for this is that the USA did not ratify 
the Additional Protocol I, only signed it. However, based on Article 18 of Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties 1969, states are obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the 
object and purpose of a treaty, however, lack of ratifi cation by all means represents that the 
USA does not agree with the Additional Protocol I, or one of its regulations. Moreover, 
Deputy Legal Adviser of the US Department of State affi rmed that “we do not favor the 
provisions of article 47 on mercenaries, which among other things introduce political 
factors that do not belong in international humanitarian law, and do not consider the 
provisions of article 47 to be part of current customary law”.30 Based on this, the USA, as a 
persistent objector, based on its sovereignty, can pull itself out from the obligatory strength 
of general customary law, if we accept the customary nature of the notion of mercenaries. 
In an opposite situation we do not even need to climb all of these steps.
However, it is not exclusively the USA which does not agree with what is being said in 
Article 47 of the Additional Protocol I and its custom-like characteristic.31 When ratifying 
the Additional Protocol I in 1989, Algeria even attached interpretative declarations to the 
document. In it the country explains that the Government of the People’s Democratic 
Republic of Algeria reserves judgement on the defi nition of mercenarism as set out in 
Article 47, para 2 of the present Protocol, this defi nition being deemed restrictive.32 
Similarly to Algeria, Cuba attached a statement to the UN Convention, in which it explains 
that it does not agree with the notion of mercenaries–based on Additional Protocol I–defi ned 
in the Convention and will further stick to the notion defi ned in the 1988 Criminal Code.33
To summarize the above-mentioned pros and contras, we can say that the custom-like 
characteristic of mercenaries can be questioned. However, it does not reduce from the value 
of the notion written in Additional Protocol I; as it is an especially widely ratifi ed 
international treaty, which provisions are compulsory for member countries. As for further 
investigations, conceptual elements of Article 47 are the standard in contrary to wide and 
easy to shape notions of literature. Thus, hereinafter, we will investigate elements of 
Additional Protocol I; and will attempt to answer the question whether employees of private 
military companies can be included in this circle or not.
29 Dinh–Daillier–Pellet–Kovács: op. cit. 167.
30 Henckaerts–Doswald-Beck: Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume II: 
Practice. op. cit. 2579.
31 However, it is not ambiguous that the USA is the most important objector, in connections 
with its military, economic and political potential. 
32 See the interpretative declarations at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORM/ 
983A7615F773CFC7C125 6402003FB232?OpenDocument (27. 05. 2013.).
33 See the statement: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ShowMTDSGDetails.aspx?src= 
UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mt dsg_no=XVIII-6&chapter=18&lang=en#EndDec (27. 05. 2013.).
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2. International legal qualifi cation of private military companies and their employees
In the media private military companies are labeled by such pejorative attributes as “dogs 
of war”, “mercenaries”, “soldiers of fortune”, moreover, these words are also used by 
professionals in order to describe armed contractors who guard VIPs, convoys, oil lines and 
other institutions in places like Iraq or Afghanistan.34 This–and because of media incidents 
that worthily became well-known and notorious–they start to mix the notions of mercenaries 
and private military companies, in spite of the numerous differences between them.
However, it is signifi cant that activities of private military companies and outsourcing 
of national military tasks are not free from historical antecedents. In mainland the institution 
of “condottieri”, at sea the institution of “privateer” spread between the 13–19th centuries. 
Condottieri (meaning military employee) was the fi rst form of organised European 
private armies. Its ancestry dates back to the 14th century Italy.35 As a result of permanent 
military activities of knighthood that lost its privileges, a special system came into life, 
setting the art of armies into focus in armed confl icts and not the victory through sacrifi cing 
masses of soldiers. Condottieri practically formed a “military state”. Their structure 
resembled of a perfectly organized business structure.36 Condottieri, called by Sobek as 
“mercenary-enterprise”37 hired lawyers and notaries in order to clarify legal questions and 
to word contracts. They also hired accountants and bankers in order to handle incomes 
more effectively, and to raise them through investments. Based on these, we can say that 
there’s a certain similarity between modern private military companies and condottieri, 
regarding business structure. However, it is a ground difference that small a number of 
private military companies provide actual armed services.38
Privateers–which are mostly incorrectly translated as pirates–were people, who carried 
out their tasks on sea, with the authorization of a state. This authorization is called Letter of 
Marque. The fi rst charter was issued by Henry III, English ruler in 1243, well before 
forming the Royal Navy.39 The charter was practically a national authorization for private 
entrepreneurs to hold supplies of enemies during war; however, privateers also proved to be 
useful in fi ghts against pirates or as a defensive unit, too.40 European states more and more 
increasingly hired these entrepreneurs through the centuries;41 their most signifi cant role 
was during the American Revolutionary War.42 Their enforcement was prohibited by the 
Paris Declaration, accepted on 16 April, 1856.43
34 Baker, D.-P.: Just warriors, Inc. The Ethics of privatized force. New York, 2011. 31.
35 Smith, E. B.: The New Condottieri and US Policy: The Privatization of Confl ict and Its 
Implications. Parameters, Winter 2002–03, 105.
36 Kollárné Nényei, J.: A XXI. század praetoriánusai? Szakmai Szemle, (2009) 3, 139–140.
37 Sobek, D.: Machiavelli’s Legacy: Domestic Politics and International Confl ict. International 
Studies Quarterly, 49 (2005) 2, 201.
38 Kollárné Nényei: op. cit. 140.
39 Richard, Th. T.: Reconsidering the Letter of Marque: Utilizing Private Security Providers 
Against Piracy. Public Contract Law Journal, 39 (2010) 3, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1591039 
(2012.08.30.) 423.
40 Ibid. 422.
41 One of the well-known privateers was Sir Francis Drake.
42 About their signifi cant role see Ross, N. J.: The Provision of Naval Defense in the Early 
American Republic, A Comparison of the U. S. Navy and Privateers, 1789–1815. The Independent 
Review, 16 (2012) 3.
43 The Declaration stated that privateering is, and remains, abolished.
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2.1. Comparison of private military companies with mercenaries
The previous historical retrospection also revealed that entities similar to private military 
companies have already existed before and even then people tried to think of them as 
mercenaries. For that very reason, based on their characteristics, private military companies 
are needed to be compared to mercenaries. 
The next table summarizes the basic differences between private military companies 
and mercenaries:44
Table 1: Differences between mercenaries and PMSCs
Mercenaries Characteristics Private Military Companies
Try to stay away from public 
attention
Publicity Transparent advertising and 
offering of their service
Small group of individuals Form of organisation Corporative, business form, 
legal personality
Usually foreign citizens, 
terrorists, criminals, gorillas 
Members Members usually have 
previously served in national 
armies, and are recruited from 
multinational database
“Bottom-up” Form of violence privatisation “Top-down”
Direct offensive activity Activity Training, professional guidance, 
military intelligence, counter-
espionage, maintenance, logistic 
support, military support, 
military attendant support, or 
reconstruction after confl icts
Black market, cash Condition of hiring Contracts, many times invitation 
to tender
Training, hiring, fi nancing and recruiting of mercenaries is prohibited by international 
law, hereby, their activity is done in highest security. In opposition to this, advertising and 
publicity are essential conditions of private military company activities. It is signifi cant that 
they quasi also organised chambers in order to implement their self-regulation.45 
Mercenaries are smaller groups of individuals, so the individual characteristic dominates, in 
opposition to PMSCs, which are mainly organized business ventures with legal personalities. 
Mercenaries are usually citizens of a foreign state and many times gerillas, criminals and 
terrorists also become members. Most employees of PMSCs have served in national armies 
before, and they are chosen for missions from multinational database. Mercenaries mostly 
represent violent form of privatisation that is built from bottom to top (bottom-up), their 
contracting parties are usually not nations or armed groups who aim at undermining 
constitutional order in countries. PMSCs take part in violent privatisation that is organized 
from top to bottom (top-down)–their contracting parties are mainly governments or 
44 The table is made by the author and based on the work of Judit Kollárné Nényei. See Kollárné 
Nényei: op. cit. 
45 Such an organisation is International Stability Operations Assosiation (ISOA), which was 
established in 2001.
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multinational companies, which mostly aim at improving reconstruction or strengthening 
inner order and safety. Mercenaries primarily take part in direct offensive activities, PMSCs 
only attend such tasks exceptionally, however, they carry out numerous other activities: 
training, professional guidance, military intelligence, counter-espionage, maintenance, 
logistic support, military support, military attendant support, or reconstruction after 
confl icts. Mercenaries–because of staying away from publicity–are used from black market 
and paid for in cash, PMSCs offer their services in public and enter into contracts with 
clients. National tasks are transacted via various application proceedings.
2.2. Are contractors the mercenaries of the 21st century?
When comparing private military companies with mercenaries, the difference that does not 
allow the two to be mixed can be clearly seen. However, from international legal 
perspective, further investigation of the question is necessary, and applicability of 
mercenaries that has previously been mentioned, needs to be further studied with regards to 
employees of private military companies. That is, elements of the notion of mercenaries 
have to be studied one by one, namely, a) their recruitment, b) direct participation in 
hostilities, c) motivation, d) nationality and place of residence, e) membership of the armed 
forces, as a negative element.
a) Recruitment
Based on Additional Protocol I, Article 47. para 2, African Union Convention Article 1. 
para. 1 and UN Convention Article 1. para. 1 that person can be regarded as a mercenary, 
who is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fi ght in an armed confl ict. Based on 
the UN Convention Article 1. para. 2 that person also can be regarded as a mercenary, who 
is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in a concerted act of 
violence aimed at overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the constitutional 
order of a State; or undermining the territorial integrity of a State.
The wording of the treaties does not mention the recruiter, so it can even be a company 
which was entrusted by a state with supplying military or safety tasks in confl ict zones. 
Contracts between companies and employees almost always remain a secret, however, 
contracts between states and companies are many times public.46
According to Louise Doswald-Beck, this one is one of the most problematic conceptual 
elements, as it is not entirely true that private military companies recruit people to take part 
in fi ghts, not even if defensive-training tasks, installation of equipments stated in contracts 
results in it. Logically, if we look at the problem from international humanitarian law point 
of view, we can conclude that it does not matter what is being stated in private military 
company contracts, if they guard military institutions against enemies–not included self-
defence and acts against ordinary miscreants–they must be regarded as they were recruited 
in order to participate in fi ghts. In this sense no difference exists between “offense” and 
“defence”, if it happens during an armed attack.47 This problem relates to the one of direct 
participation in hostilities, so it will further be discussed later.
46 The short abstracts of the contracts which are exceeding 6.5 million dollars, are available at 
the website of the U. S. Department of Defence. See http://www.defense.gov/contracts/archive.aspx 
(2013.05.30.).
47 Doswald-Beck, L.: Private military companies under international humanitarian law. https://
lapa. princeton.edu/conferences/military07/restricted/doswald-beck_military07.pdf (31. 05. 2013.) 8.
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Companies of military services usually do not maintain greater permanent 
infrastructure, hereby, recruiting happens via various channels. There are international 
databases about possible people to be asked, private military companies publish their actual 
job offers even on their websites, or they draw on in-between companies.48 These companies 
do the recruiting and training, they deliver the contractors to the confl ict zones on behalf of 
the employer.49 Its outcome is an especially complicated, unperspicuous contractor – sub-
contractor structure,50 which opens the door for misuse, in some cases, for violating human 
rights. Of course, sub-contractors have–respective to laws of their permanent residence’s 
country–legal personalities. Independent legal personality excludes to call the “parent 
establishment” to account because of violation of law committed by its sub-contractors or 
its employees.51 We can conclude from Karácsony Veronika’s interview with contractors 
that entering into a contract, detailed and fi nal clarifi cation of condition usually takes place 
on the territory of the action, after having started the job.52
From one side, employees of private military companies consist of thousands of 
soldiers from general reduction of armies, on the other side, from strengthening fl ow of 
soldiers due to change for professional army. Besides previous soldiers, past employees of 
police and other violent services also become employees in increasing numbers.53 However, 
this can be a problem, too. One UN Workshop called the attention to previous soldiers and 
policemen recruited to be “security men” who may become armed private soldiers in low 
intensity armed confl icts or in situations followed by confl icts.54 
b) Direct participation in hostilites
Based on Additional Protocol I Article 47 para. 2 and African Union Convention Article 1 
para. 1, second element of the notion of mercenaries is direct participation in the hostilities. 
However, a contrario, it is signifi cant that Article I of UN Convention does not make direct 
participation in hostilities a conceptual element.
48 Holmqvist, C.: Private Security Companies–The Case for Regulation. SIPRI Policy Paper, 
(2005) 9. http://books.sipri.org/fi les/PP/SIPRIPP09.pdf (05. 05. 2013.) 6.
49 About occurred cases see: UN Doc. A/HRC/7/7/Add.2. Report of the Working Group on the 
question of the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of 
the right of peoples to self-determination, Mission to Peru, 7; UN Doc. A/HRC/7/7/Add.3. Report of 
the Working Group on the question of the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights 
and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, Mission to Fiji, 9; UN Doc. A/
HRC/7/7/Add.4. Report of the Working Group on the question of the use of mercenaries as a means 
of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, 
Mission to Chile, 10; UN Doc. A/HRC/4/42/Add.1. Report of the Working Group on the question of 
the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of 
peoples to self-determination, Mission to Honduras, 7.
50 Crawford: op. cit. 10.
51 Ryngaert, C.: Litigating Abuses Committed by Private Military Companies. The European 
Journal of International Law, 19 (2008) 5, 1039.
52 Karácsony, V.: A biztonság privatizálása – Nemzetközi tapasztalatok és azok hatása a Magyar 
Honvédségre. (PhD thesis). http://193.224.76.2/downloads/konyvtar/digitgy/phd/2012/karacsony_
veronika.pdf (31. 05. 2013.) 76.
53 Varga, K.: Civilek a harcmezőn – katonai magánvállalatok. MKI-tanulmányok, T-2009/12. 9.
54 UN Doc. A/HRC/7/7. Report of the Working Group on the question of the use of mercenaries 
as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-
determination 24.
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From international humanitarian law point of view, determining of direct participation 
has a crucial role, as direct participation is the base of demarcation between military and 
civil inhabitants. Members of a state’s armed forces (except medical and ecclesiastical 
personnel) and members of organized armed forces can usually be looked upon as legitimate 
military targets, except if, they surrender or become unable to fi ght in any other ways. Civil 
people are usually defended from direct offenses, except if, and for that period when they 
directly participate in hostilities.55
In spite of their signifi cance, neither international humanitarian law’s contractual 
regulations, nor the practice of governmental or international courts defi ne exactly direct 
participation in fi ghts. So, in order to study this conceptual notion, general regulation in 
respect to international humanitarian law needed to be used, that is a treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.56
Recognising problems of defi ning direct participation, International Committee of the 
Red Cross initiated negotiations in 2003, which resulted in the publication of the document, 
entitled Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 2009.57
According to the Recommendation IV of the Interpretive Guidance, “the notion of 
direct participation in hostilities refers to specifi c act carried out by individuals as part of 
the conduct of hostilities between parties to an armed confl ict.”58 Furthermore, the 
Interpretive Guidance clarifi es that this notion needs to be understood in the same way in 
connection to international and non-international armed confl icts as well.
In reality, direct participation in fi ghts can come true in various forms and intensity, so 
when judging whether the behaviour counts as direct participation, every possible 
circumstance, so characteristics of the given place and time are also needed to be examined 
during the process.59
Why is it so important to highlight that the notion of direct participation only refers to 
defi ned behaviours? Because extension outside of defi ned behaviours of the notion of direct 
participation would threaten the international humanitarian law’s distinction between 
continuous protection of fi lled status and loss of temporary protection because of action.
In order to defi ne the relevant forms of behaviour, the Recommendation V provides 
help. “In order to qualify as direct participation in hostilities, a specifi c act must meet the 
following cumulative criteria:
1. the act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capacity 
of a party to an armed confl ict or, alternatively, to infl ict death, injury, or destruction on 
persons or objects protected against direct attack (threshold of harm);
2. there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result either 
from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an 
integral part (direct causation); and
55 Csapó, Zs.: Civil a pályán? Kommentár Az ellenségeskedésekben való közvetlen részvétel 
fogalmáról című dokumentumhoz (Civils on the ground? Commentary to document titled 
Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International 
Humanitarian Law). Föld-rész, (2010) 1–2., 127.
56 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 1969. Article 31 para. 1. 
57 Melzer, Nils.: Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
under International Humanitarian Law. ISRC 2009. http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/
htmlall/direct-participation-report_ res/$File/direct-participation-guidance-2009-icrc.pdf (31. 05. 2013.).
58 Melzer: op. cit. 1013.
59 Csapó: op. cit. 112.
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3. the act must be specifi cally designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm 
in support of a party to the confl ict and to the detriment of another (belligerent nexus).”60
Thus, three conjunctive conditions must meet in order to defi ne a stipulated behaviour 
as direct participation in hostilities: 1. causing mortifi cation, 2. direct cause–effect relation 
between behaviour and mortifi cation, 3. relationship between behaviour and hostility of 
parties to an armed confl ict. 
As we have previously mentioned it in connection with recruiting, private military 
companies many times refer to that they only offer protective services and do not participate 
directly in hostilities. However, protection also counts as direct participation in fi ghts. 
International humanitarian law does not make any difference between offensive and 
defensive actions.61 This is only the other side of a coin. For instance in Iraq, private 
military companies had the tasks of protecting military institutions, which, in case of 
military targets and armed fi ghts reaches the level of direct participation.62 
Besides protective services, private military companies usually allude to that they only 
carry out preparatory activities, like arming, transportation, collecting information, etc. In 
this case the question is: when does direct participation in fi ghts begin?
According to the Interpretive Guidance’s Recommendation VI, “measures preparatory 
to the execution of a specifi c act of direct participation in hostilities, as well as the 
deployment to and the return from the location of its execution, constitute an integral part 
of that act.”63 When judging direct participation, it is neither necessary, nor suffi cient that 1. 
a preparatory measure occur immediately before (temporal proximity) or 2. in close 
geographical proximity to the execution of a specifi c hostile act or that it be indispensable 
for its execution.64
Thus, we can establish that based upon the investigation of the fi rst two conceptual 
notions, employees of private military companies cannot be parted from mercenaries. 
Criterion of recruiting and participation in fi ghts are all accomplished by companies and 
their employees, too.
c) Motivation
Based on Additional Protocol I. Article 47 para. 2, African Union Convention Article 1 
para. 1, the third element of mercenaries is fi nancial motivation. According to the treaties’ 
wording, mercenaries are people, who are motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially 
by the desire for private gain. Private gain is promised by or on behalf of the Party to the 
60 Melzer: op. cit. 1016.
61 Gillard, E.-Ch.: Business goes to war: private military/security companies and international 
humanitarian law. International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 88 (2006) 863, 540.
62 As we have mentioned before, private military companies many times refer to that they only 
offer protective services and do not participate directly in hostilities. The facts are just the opposite. In 
October 2007, an oversight panel of the United States House of Representatives released a report 
indicating that Blackwater employees had been involved in at least 196 fi re-fi ghts in Iraq since 2005, 
an average of 1.4 shootings per week. In 84 per cent of those cases, the reports stated, Blackwater 
employees opened fi re fi rst, despite contract stipulations to make use of force only in self-defence. 
See UN Doc. A/63/325 Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Working Group 
on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right 
of peoples to self-determination (25 August 2008) 9.
63 Melzer: op. cit. 1031.
64 Ibid. 1032.
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confl ict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to 
combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party. Hence, this is 
also a conjunctive condition, too. Therefore, necessary are: 1.) individual desire for private 
gain, 2.) private gain must be promised by or on behalf of the Party to the confl ict and 3.) 
material compensation substantially in excess of that paid to soldiers in the armed forces.
Article 1 para. 2 of UN Convention only supplements fi nancial motivation with a 
highly questionable attribute; it demands “signifi cant” personal profi t from mercenaries.
Previously, when reviewing literature notions, we noticed that fi nancial motivation as 
differentia specifi ca was highlighted by every author. In the case of international legal 
investigation of the notion of mercenaries, it is the same, too, as fi nancial motivation is the 
most crucial element of conceptual criteria laid down in treaties. This has already been 
highlighted during preparations of Additional Protocol I.65 Financial motivation makes it 
possible to terminate mercenaries from volunteers joining armies, who are mostly not 
motivated by gaining wealth but by noble beliefs.66 Although it is questionable whether we 
can terminate employees of private military companies from mercenaries, when we 
investigate their motivation.
Let us start with the fi rst part of the conceptual notion, the individual desire for private 
gain. One of the UN research groups arrived at the conclusion after their research that 
primarily motivation of military employees is gaining fi nancial wealth.67 However, this 
does not need to be morally condemned, as great amount of private military company 
employees are recruited from developing countries or states with high percentages of 
unemployment. It further needs to be noted that gaining wealth is not an exclusive 
motivation. Desire for adventure, continuing military services (e.g. in case of vets) or 
simply proposition of doing something can mean nearly similar motivation.68 During her 
research, Veronika Karácsony arrived at the conclusion that “previous soldiers and police 
men undertake jobs in private military companies because of professional improvement and 
gaining experience, or great cut-backs or constraint superannuations”.69 Based on these, we 
can talk about motivational mixture of private military company employees, in which 
gaining wealth is a signifi cant but not an exclusive element.
65 See Offi cial Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffi rmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Confl icts, Geneva (1974–1977), Vol. XV. 
Committee III Report, CDDH/236/Rev. l. 99. “Most important of all a mercenary is a person who is 
motivated to fi ght essentially or primarily by the desire for, as one representative put it, ‘hard cash’. 
He fi ghts for monetary gain whether it be higher pay than is given to the regular armed forces of the 
state or by way of bonuses for persons killed or captured. The defi nition must be so framed, however, 
that the individual who enlists as a regular member of the armed forces because he is attracted by 
good pay is not on that account deemed to be a mercenary.”
66 Sandoz, Y.–Swinarski, Ch.–Zimmermann, B. (ed.): Commentary on the Additional Protocols 
of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. ICRC, Geneva, 1987, 615.
67 UN Doc. A/HRC/7/7. Report of the Working Group on the question of the use of mercenaries 
as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-
determination, 15.
68 Kascakova, D.: Mercenaries reconsidered–The Ethics and the Future Role of Private Military 
Companies. ISA Annual Convention, 2011. http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p502121_index.html 
(05. 05. 2013.) 16.
69 Karácsony: op. cit.  77.
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The second part refers to the origin of fi nancial remuneration as it must be promised 
by or on behalf of the Party to the confl ict. From theoretical point of view, this element is 
the least problematic one, as only the road of money needs to be backtracked, and if the 
fi ghting party can be found in the chain, this element comes true.
Finally, fi nancial remuneration must signifi cantly exceed the amount paid for soldiers 
of armed groups. They usually refer to that employees of private military companies 
signifi cantly earn more than equal members of armies.70 The question is that whether 
employees of private military companies really partake in overpayment or not.
The question cannot be exactly answered, as great differences exist in payments of 
employees. According to Del Prado’s research, employees can be organized into a 
hierarchical pyramid. At the top of the pyramid stand highly trained soldiers from the USA, 
who are the most greatly paid ones. Under them take place employees from Australia, 
United Kingdom, Canada and South-Africa, who are as well, greatly paid. On the third 
level we can fi nd the so-called third country members (e.g. Chile, Nepal, Peru, Honduras). 
Their payment is between 1000–3000 $ per month. At the bottom of the pyramid take place 
the locals (Iraq, Afghanistan), who are paid the worst.71
If we strictly look at the payments of private military company employees in 
comparison to payment of soldiers who undertake similar tasks at an army, we can say that 
the difference is really signifi cant. In 2007, a private security man working at for instance 
Blackwater or DynCorp could even earn 1.222 $ per day (455.000 $ per year). In 
comparison, a warrant offi cer earned 140–190 $ per day (51–69.000 $ per year).72 These 
numbers are only suitable for comparison at fi rst sight indeed, as the 1.222 $ is the billing 
rate, not the amount that is actually paid for employees.73 Besides the employee’s payment, 
billing rate also includes indirect charges of private companies, overhead charges, and 
profi t.74 As a result of this, employees only get about quarter or fi fth of that amount which 
was paid for the private service by the contractor.75
Finally, we have to ask the question that from what amount does payment of private 
military company employees exceed signifi cantly the amount paid for soldiers of armed 
forces. Based on our opinion, it is possible that some contractors meet the above-mentioned 
criteria, however, they can be parted from mercenaries when investigating motivational 
elements.
70 See Singer, P. W.: Corporate Warriors. The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. Ithaca–
London, 2003, 77; Schreier, F.–Caparini, M.: Privatising security: law, practice and governance of 
private military and security companies. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 
Occasional Paper, (2005) 6, 20–21; Salzman, Z.: Private Military Contractors and the Taint of a 
Mercenary Reputation. New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 40 (2008) 3, 
885; Dickinson, L. A.: Military Lawyers, Private Contractors, and the Problem of International Law 
Compliance. New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 42 (2010) 2, 375–376.
71 Del Prado: op. cit. 437.
72 Stiglitz, J. E.–Bilmes, L. J.: The Three Trillion Dollar War–The True Cost of the Iraq Confl ict. 
New York, 2008. 12.
73 Huskey, K. A.: The American Way: Private Military Contractors & U. S. Law After 9/11. 
PRIV-WAR National Report Series, 2010. http://priv-war.eu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/
nr-03-10-USA.pdf (06. 06. 2013.) 10.
74 The Congress of the United States–Congressional Budget Offi ce: Contractors’ Support of U. 
S. Operations in Iraq, 2008, August http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/fi les/cbofi les/ftpdocs/96xx/
doc9688/08-12-iraqcont ractors.pdf (06. 06. 2013.) 14.
75 Karácsony: op. cit. 9.
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d) Nationality and place of residence
Based on Article 47 para. 2 of Additional Protocol I, Article 1 para. 1 of African Union 
Convention and Article 1 para. 1 of UN Convention the fourth element of the notion of 
mercenaries refers to their citizenship and state of residence. Based on this, mercenaries are 
people, who are “neither a national of a Party to the confl ict nor a resident of territory 
controlled by a Party to the confl ict”. Article 1 para. 2 of UN Convention does not broaden 
the notion for armed confl icts when it rules that someone counts as a mercenary in any 
other situation who is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which such an act 
is directed. 
According to Louise Doswald-Beck, it is not at all clear whether this condition applies 
to the PMC’s state of incorporation (in which case all its members would be treated as 
having that nationality) or the nationality of the individual member or both as private 
military companies did not mean a problem when the Additional Protocol I was accepted.76
Based on the fourth element of the notion, besides that the aim they serve is acceptable 
by international law and morally, those who are citizens or residents of any of the fi ghting 
parties cannot be regarded as mercenaries.77 This conceptual notion was highly criticised 
based on its applicability in case of private military companies, as it leads to a totally ill-
founded conclusion between citizens and residents of the fi ghting states and between 
citizens and residents of other states.78 For instance: referring to the Afghanistan war, this 
conceptual notion excludes citizens and residents of the USA, Great Britain and Afghanistan 
from the notion of mercenaries, not employees from Honduras or Chile (only if they meet 
the other conditions).
According to the latest data, 113.376 contractors are employed in Afghanistan, out of 
which 30.568 are US citizens, 35.118 are citizens of a third state and 48.050 are citizens of 
Afghanistan.79 This means that at least 70% of private military company employees in 
Afghanistan fall outside of the notion of mercenaries.
Besides, it often is a part of private military company contracts that their employees 
obtain the citizenship of the contracting state, hence, they also fall outside the international 
legal regime referring to mercenaries.80
e) Membership of the armed forces
Based on Article 47 para. 2 of Additional Protocol I, Article 1 para. 1 of African Union 
Convention and Article 1 para. 1 of UN Convention the fi fth element of the notion of 
mercenaries is membership of the armed forces of the fi ghting parties as a negative element. 
Hence, one can be regarded as a mercenary who is not member of the armed force of any of 
the fi ghting Parties; and has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the confl ict on 
offi cial duty as a member of its armed forces. Article 1 para. 2 of UN Convention says 
similar, as based on this, a mercenary is a person who has not been sent by a State on 
76 Doswald-Beck: op. cit. 9.
77 Sandoz–Swinarski–Zimmermann: op. cit. 580.
78 Gillard: op. cit. 569.
79 Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq, and Afghanistan 
(July 2012). http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/reports_and_stats/us_data/dod_quarterly_census/
dod_quarterly_census_jul_2012.pdf (2013.06.12.).
80 See HC 577 Private Military Companies: Option for Regulation 2001–2002, Foreign 
and Commonwealth Offi ce. http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/consultations-mercenaries 
(2013.06.12.) 7.
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offi cial duty; and is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose territory the act 
is undertaken.
Employees of private military companies act not as individuals but as parts of that 
organisation which lead their activity. Furthermore Singer highlights that employees have 
responsibility for their bosses, who have contractual obligations for their employers. That 
is, when the employer is a state, private military companies quasi act as national deputies 
on international stage.81 Moreover, Green calls upon that if the force that the mercenary 
offers his help to is an organised force, then mercenaries are most likely members of that 
organised force, and this also pulls it out from the notion of a mercenary.82
It follows from this that we can regard private military employees as members of 
armed forces. This is also understated by the contract cited by Singer, which was made 
between Sandline International and Papua New Guinea, in which employees of private 
military services were named “special soldiers” and were looked upon as part of armed 
forces.83 Which is even more signifi cant, PMSC so much integrated into US security system 
that in 2006, the US Department of Defense regarded them as “total force” in the Four-year 
Defense Investigation issued by the Department of Defence. According to the document, 
the Department of Defence is the greatest employer of the world, as it has more than 3 
million direct employees. Parts of “total force” are Active Component, Reserve Component, 
civilians and contractors that is PMSCs.84
Conclusion
The aim of the study that we worded in the introduction was to demonstrate the applicability 
of international legal regulations in connection to mercenaries to private military services. 
The most signifi cant question was that whether we can put contractors under the notion of 
mercenaries with all of its consequences?
The answer to this question can be that every single element of the notion of 
mercenaries only comes true on very rare occasions. It is a conjunctive conceptual notion, 
so missing even one conceptual element makes the application of the rules to mercenaries 
impossible. As we noted in the study, the fi rst two elements (recruiting and direct 
participation in hostilities) are accomplished by the contractors. In case of motivation–not 
counting the pre-condemned complicated and hard questions of demonstration–there is a 
possibility to draw a line between employees of private military companies and mercenaries. 
Nationality and membership of the armed forces as negative criterion places most 
contractors outside the international legal concept of mercenaries.
As a conclusion we can say that employees of private military companies can be 
regarded as mercenaries only on the rarest occasions. However, this conclusion leads to 
another question, namely that if they cannot be regarded as mercenaries, then what rules 
apply to them from international legal point of view? Whether they are combatants, civilians 
or maybe something else?
81 Singer, P. W.: War, Profi ts and the Vacuum of Law. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 
42 (2005) 2, 532.
82 Green, L. C.: The contemporary law of armed confl icts. Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 2000. 115–116.
83 Singer: War, Profi ts… op. cit. 532–533.
84 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, Department of Defense. http://www.defense.gov/qdr/
report/Rep ort20060203.pdf (12. 06. 2013.) 75.
